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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An insurance application and the resulting policy must be considered together to determine 
the intent of the parties. If the policy delivered by the insurer varies from the signed application, the 
insurer should be bound by the representations in the application. In this case, the application 
referred to insurance for "all perils", a legal term of art in the insurance field which refers to 
coverage for all risks or perils not caused by the insured's fraud. However, the policy only covered 
certain specifically listed perils, and was not an all perils policy. The listed perils did not include 
snow damage to the Insureds' cabin. Because the insurance application must be considered with the 
policy to determine the intent of the parties, the trial court should have found coverage, or at least 
an ambiguity in they type of insurance that Farmers had agreed to provide. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE INSURANCE APPLICATION AND POLICY 
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER TO 
DETERMINE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES 
Farmers apparently concedes that U.C.A. §31A-21-105(l)(a) (1986) binds the insurer to a 
statement or representation in the application for insurance. Despite admitting that it is bound to any 
statement in the application, Farmers argues that the application is only considered as part of the 
contract if it is attached to the policy when delivered to the insured. This completely misreads U. C.A. 
§31A-21-106 (1986). That statute creates three sources for the terms of the insurance contract: 1) 
the policy, 2) the application, 3) any other document attached to the policy. The phrase "attached 
to the policy" only modifies the third category, of other documents not a part of the policy or the 
application. To hold otherwise would create an inconsistency between §31A-21-105 and §31A-21-
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106 (1986). Statutes are construed in a manner to eliminate inconsistency rather than to create 
inconsistency. 
Farmers also overlooks U.SF.&G. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), where the Utah 
Supreme Court expressly looked to the insurance application to determine the amount of coverage 
the insured was purchasing. The Court there stated: 
A reasonable purchaser of insurance could surely read the USF & G policy to provide 
$300,000 coverage in excess of public liability insurance coverage. The application 
for insurance (a request for policy change in this case) stated that the 
underinsured motorist coverage was $300,000 each accident. At the beginning of 
the section [of the application] on underinsured motorist coverage is a blank for the 
insertion of the dollar amount for the limit of liability for "each accident". That 
section's language indicates that the insured has a fixed maximum dollar amount of 
coverage. 
Id. at 523, emphasis added. The Sandt court then went on to compare the application language above 
with the insurance contract itself, and concluded there was an ambiguity. The critical point is that 
the Sandt court expressly referred to the insurance application as part of the overall insurance 
contract with the insurer. The trial court, however, refused to consider the policy as having any 
bearing on the intent of the parties to this insurance contract. This was a clear legal error. 
Farmers trots out the case of Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993) in 
support of its argument. But Cullum did not involve a statement in the application for insurance 
setting forth what the policy limits would be. Cullum would truly be analogous if the Cullum 
insureds had requested $100,000.00 in insurance, but Farmers only issued a policy for $25,000.00, 
the statutory minimum. In that situation, one would hope that this court would easily conclude that 
the Cullum insureds would be entitled to the full coverage set forth in the application. 
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POINT TWO 
FARMERS SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO REFUSE PROVIDING THE 
COVERAGE SET FORTH IN THE INSURANCE APPLICATION 
In Allen v. Prud. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) the court recognized that 
traditional contract doctrines such as estoppel would still be needed to fill in the gaps between 
legislative and executive regulation of insurance policies. This case simply calls for the application 
of one of those traditional contract doctrines, that of estoppel. In the application, printed by Farmers, 
it created an impression that it was selling "all perils" insurance. The insureds expressly relied upon 
that application and the impression that they were being offered "all perils" insurance. Having 
created that impression by their own written application, Farmers should now be estopped to argue 
that the policy is not so broad. The case of Perkins v. Great- West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125 
(Utah App. 1991) only held that a party could not rely upon a course of conduct in paying claims to 
create estop the insurer from relying upon the written expression of the parties' intent. Where the 
insurer has indicated in writing what the contract will consist of, the court should estop the insurer 
from doing otherwise. 
Farmers also makes a factual argument that the Insureds were unreasonable as a matter of law 
in relying upon the insurance application as opposed to the policy. Questions of reasonableness are 
ordinarily left up to a jury, who might well beg to differ with Farmers' counsel on that point. 
CONCLUSION 
To adopt Farmers' rule would completely negate the intent of the parties as expressed in the 
insurance application, which is a contract in and of itself. It would allow insurers to substitute 
insurance with less coverage than is agreed to in the application, so long as the application is not 
physically attached to the policy. It would relegate insurance purchasers to a sort of third-class 
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consumer world, where "bait and switch" is judicially condoned, leaving insurance purchasers with 
less protection than consumers of any other good or service. Requiring insurers to comply with the 
written terms of an insurance application only promotes honesty and fair dealing between insurers 
and prospective insureds. 
For these reasons, the court should construe the application with the policy and any 
attachments to the policy in determining the intent of the parties. The insureds are not suggesting that 
the court go beyond the written expressions of the parties' intent, to create a new contract out of 
whole cloth based upon the insureds' reasonable expectations. The insureds only ask this court to 
enforce the Allen rule, by requiring the insurer to live up to the complete written transaction between 
the parties, including the application. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 1999. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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